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I. PRELIMINARIES
POLITICAL philosophers are not shy to prescribe ways to design social andpolitical institutions so as to eradicate or at least mitigate various actual
injustices. The conventional wisdom is that such prescriptions are the province of
nonideal theory but that ideal theory is required as a guide for nonideal theory. On
this view, our first task is to specify fully just principles of regulation—that is,
principles that regulate the constitution of fully just institutional arrangements.1
These principles subsequently guide and constrain our attempts to prescribe
institutional solutions to address actual injustices.2 Call this the ideal guidance
approach to institutional design. This view is mistaken, or so I will argue. Ideal
theory does not yield guiding principles that actual institutionsmust aim to realize,
even if only approximately. Fortunately, the conventionalwisdom is also avoidable.
Recent debate on the relationship of ideal theory to nonideal theory suffers
from a dearth of clear alternatives to the ideal guidance approach. On the one
hand, those who reject the notion that ideal theory is required as a guide for
nonideal theory wind up rejecting ideal theory altogether as “normatively
useless” without offering any alternative method for prescribing institutional
reforms.3 On the other hand, those who defend ideal theory against this charge
wind up defending the notion that ideal theory properly understood is still useful
as a guide for nonideal theory despite the limitations noted by critics, in part
because there appears to be no other way to go about prescribing morally
progressive institutional reforms.4
*Earlier drafts were presented to audiences in the philosophy and political science departments at
the University of Michigan, as well as at the British Society for Ethical Theory Annual Meeting.
Thanks to participants for the profitable discussions. I am particularly grateful to Elizabeth Anderson,
Zev Berger, Steve Campbell, Bill Clark, Mika Lavaque-Manty, Peter Railton, and two anonymous
reviewers for helpful comments. Support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada (award no. 752-2007-0083) is gratefully acknowledged.
1My use of the term “principle of regulation” follows Cohen (2003, p. 241).
2Cf. Rawls 1999a, pp. 7–8, 215–16; 1999b, p. 89ff.
3See Geuss 2008; Farrelly 2007; Mills 2005. Amartya Sen (2009) is a partial exception here. He
joins the others in rejecting ideal theory—or “transcendental theory”, as he calls it—as being neither
necessary nor sufficient for nonideal purposes, but goes beyond the others in offering a vaguely
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4Robeyns 2008. Simmons 2010. Stemplowska 2008. Valentini 2009.
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To overcome this stalemate, we should pay less attention to characterizing the
ideal/nonideal distinction and focus squarely on the following methodological
question: how should we approach the task of prescribing feasible institutional
solutions to address actual injustice? The issue here is identifying the relevant
inputs as well as the appropriate procedure for turning those inputs into
institutional design prescriptions. Although this issue is clearly related to debate
concerning the ideal/nonideal theory distinction, I don’t want to engage that
debate directly. This is because “nonideal theory” is ambiguous between three
different conceptions of the task of nonideal theory: (1) theorizing that identifies
intermediate institutional reforms to help us transition from actual institutional
arrangements to fully just institutional arrangements; (2) theorizing that identifies
institutional arrangements that we should aspire to implement under actual
conditions; and (3) theorizing that prescribes feasible institutional solutions to
actual injustice.5 Given the multifarious philosophical controversies surrounding
that distinction, retaining the term “nonideal theory” allows this ambiguity to
persist and potentially obscures my central question. Hence, to maintain focus on
the central issue, I will refer to theorizing that prescribes feasible institutional
solutions to actual injustice as clinical institutional theory, or clinical theory for
short. To reiterate, the central issue here is how, methodologically speaking, we
should approach the task of clinical theory.
Against the conventional widsom, I propose that clinical theorists should
adopt an institutional failure analysis approach, which takes its primary design
task to be obviating or averting social failures. The main innovation of this
approach is to ground our evaluation of institutional arrangements on a detailed
understanding of the causal processes that generate actual problematic outcomes.
So conceived, failure analysis enables clinical theorists to prescribe more effective
solutions to injustice because it focuses on understanding the injustice, rather
than on specifying an ideal of justice. In so doing, failure analysis better fulfills the
objective of clinical theory, namely, to think about how, in the midst of current
injustice, we might bring about social conditions that are more just than our
current conditions.
II. THE ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING PROBLEMS OF
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Institutions are, in Douglass North’s familiar words, “the rules of the game in a
society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human
5We might call these (1) transitional theory, (2) nonideal aspirational theory, and (3) clinical theory
respectively. Failing to disambiguate “nonideal theory” has had the effect of conflating the various
conceptions. So, for example, it is not uncommon to find philosophers who think that doing clinical
theory amounts to doing transitional theory. Indeed, this is what the ideal guidance approach
suggests.
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interaction”.6 More specifically, institutions are sets of (formal or informal) rules
that establish roles and stabilize behavioral norms and expectations for
occupants of those roles; these norms and expectations subsequently regularize
patterns of interaction among individual agents. Since social outcomes arise from
the aggregation of particular interactions, institutions are important for shaping
social outcomes and their consequences for individuals’ lives. For this reason,
institutions are morally significant. Of course, an institution’s effect on outcomes
is not deterministic. An institutional structure sets the range of possible outcomes
and makes some outcomes more probable than others. Thus, when assessing
institutional arrangements, we not only care about the observed outcomes
actually realized by institutions, but also the range and likelihood of outcomes
they make possible.7
To the extent that we make choices over alternative sets of rules to regulate
interactions, we design institutions. The task of clinical institutional design
comprises two distinct sets of problems: architectural problems and engineering
problems. To get some traction on this distinction, consider it in reference to a
material structure such as a skyscraper or a bridge. The architect’s objective is
to design a structure that creatively organizes its components using mass,
space, form, texture, and so on, in a way that embodies some set of values
(often functional, economic, artistic, and aesthetic values).8 The engineer’s task
is to apply mathematical and scientific principles to solve technical problems
involved in the design of the structure within the constraints set by physical,
technological, economic, environmental, and ethical considerations.9 To be
sure, the two tasks intersect—there is a discipline called “architectural
engineering”—but, on the whole, architects understand their task as more
closely aligned with art whereas engineers uniformly understand themselves as
doing applied science.
Analogously, the architectural problems comprised by institutional design
concern the ways in which different configurations of institutional components
embody different sets of values. Here the salient values are likely to be functional,
economic, and (of primary importance to moral philosophers) moral values. The
engineering problems comprised by institutional design concern the application
of social scientific principles with an eye to making institutions capable of
withstanding the pressures to which they will be subject. Somewhat crudely, we
can call the branch of institutional design that deals with architectural issues
“applied ethics” and the branch that deals with the engineering issues “applied
social science”.
A key feature of the analogy is that the architectural and engineering
problematics are mutually constraining as a result of their interdependence. A
6North 1990, p. 3.
7Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to my attention.
8Cf. Ching 2007, ch. 1; Roth 1993, ch. 1; Unwin 2003, ch. 1.
9Cf. Pahl et al. 2007, ch. 1; Holtzapple and Reece 2003, ch. 1.
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generic example from the world of residential construction serves to illustrate
the point. For any particular house we build, the architect gives us a set of
drawings specifying the characteristics of the house—the location of the
interior walls, the size of the window and door openings, the pitch and shape
of the roof. For the most part, the architect confines herself to specifying the
way the house is to look. When it comes to specifying the required structural
features to make the architectural design work, the drawings are turned over to
an engineer. Whereas the architect specifies the size of the openings, an engineer
specifies the requirements for the “header” (a beam-like support placed above
a window or door opening) to carry the load to be placed above the opening.
The architect specifies the pitch and span of the roof, but it is a roof truss
engineer who makes sure that the roof trusses are able to span the distance
between load bearing points. If it is ever the case that a house can’t be made
to work structurally as the architect designed it—for example, the openings are
too wide to accommodate adequate load bearing support—the drawings are
sent back to the architect for modification. So the engineer specifies the
structural limits within which the architect’s design must work. But the
engineer doesn’t have a carte blanche when it comes to devising structural
solutions; these are to be consistent with the architect’s design aim as far as
possible. If the architect calls for large, wide open living spaces, the engineer is
not free to unilaterally add interior walls to accommodate a simpler roof truss
design. Hence, the architect and engineer each set limits on the other’s set of
possible solutions for achieving their objective.
One way to characterize where conventional clinical theorizing has gone awry
is to say that it has largely focused on applied ethics while paying insufficient
attention to the relevant engineering issues. This is not to say that the applied
ethics component is unimportant. Theorists have made some important progress
in thinking about the moral values we want our institutions to embody and how
different institutional configurations might embody different values. But if the
analogy I’ve drawn is apt, then progress on the architectural problems is
insufficient. To design feasible institutional solutions for unjust conditions, we
must make progress on both the architectural and the engineering problems. This
is because a structure that effectively embodies a chosen set of values but is
incapable of withstanding the pressures to which it is subject ceases to embody
the chosen values once it ceases to exist as designed.
Focusing almost entirely on the architectural issues has unfortunately
recommended an institutional design procedure that limits the extent to which
clinical theorists pay attention to the relevant engineering problems. Since
philosophers have traditionally treated institutional design as an applied ethics
problem, their design projects have typically focused on the application of ideal
principles of justice to the design of actual institutions. This is why ideal theory
has been thought to guide and constrain clinical theory. The basic intuition is that
we want our actual institutions to bring about more just states of affairs. The
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“more just” here intimates a target ideal according to which the justice of states
of affairs can be measured. This suggests that clinical theory must seek ways to
close the gap between current states of affairs and ideally just states of affairs.
Hence, we require ideal theory to characterize a fully just institutional order,
which serves as a regulative ideal, a guide to insure that our clinical theorizing is
aimed in “the right direction”. If a candidate proposal violates one or more of the
principles of regulation identified by ideal theory or if it doesn’t deliver
institutions that more closely approximate the ideal, it is discarded. This ideal
guidance approach leads us to judge design proposals according to their fit with
the principles that regulate ideal institutional arrangements. Accordingly, we
acquire a tendency to ignore the engineering question: how will the proposed
institution fare in the face of the pressures to which it will be subject? The issue
here isn’t simply that clinical theorists are insufficiently attentive to important
feasibility considerations. Feasibility considerations are but one set in the class
of engineering considerations, which also includes stability and efficiency
considerations. Moreover, even if we simply pay increased attention to feasibility,
the ideal guidance approach leads our consideration of this issue to be
circumscribed by the principles of regulation identified by ideal theory. We surely
want our designs to be feasible, but our approach to design leads us to be
primarily concerned with the extent to which our designs comport with ideal
principles of regulation. This leads us to give short shrift to the engineering
problems comprised by institutional design.
III. UNPACKING THE IDEAL GUIDANCE APPROACH: A CASE STUDY
Allen Buchanan’s proposal to reform the international practice of recognition
among sovereign states nicely demonstrates the ideal guidance approach in
action.10 Buchanan’s proposal is an especially illuminating case study for two
reasons. First, he clearly intends to prescribe a feasible solution to actual
injustice.11 Once we are assured that Buchanan intends his proposal to be so, we
can ask whether he succeeds in prescribing reforms that are likely to “produce
moral improvement in the particular system that now exists”. Second, he
self-consciously adopts the ideal guidance approach:
The task of ideal theory is to set the most important and most distant moral targets
for a better future, the ultimate standards for evaluating current international law.
Nonideal theory’s task is to guide our efforts to approach those ultimate
targets. . . .12
10Buchanan 2004.
11“[W]e should eschew speculation about what constitutes a comprehensive set of ideal
substantive institutional principles and concentrate on nonideal theory. . . . [W]e should focus on
ascertaining which principles, if implemented, would produce moral improvements in the particular
system that now exists” (ibid., p. 67).
12Ibid., p. 60ff.
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The result is clinical theorizing that is assiduously constrained by ideal theoretic
principles, which enables us to investigate the effect of this approach on
Buchanan’s nonideal prescription.13
The structure of Buchanan’s book reflects his methodological orientation. Part
one constitutes Buchanan’s ideal theory. This comprises two basic theses
concerning the design of the ideal international system.
(1) Institutions—in particular, the international legal system—must be designed
to protect and promote basic human rights. These include a right to life, a
right to physical security, a right against enslavement, a right to the means
of subsistence, and a right against systematic racial, ethnic, or sexual
discrimination.14
(2) International law ought to require nation-states to satisfy a minimal
constitutional democracy condition.15
These theses support a justice-based conception of political legitimacy: a state
exercises political power legitimately only if it respects basic human rights and is
minimally democratic.16
In part two, Buchanan applies his ideal theoretic account of political
legitimacy to reforming the institutionalized practice of sovereign recognition.
The problem posed by the current practice is that it permits human
rights-violating states to enjoy all the prerogatives of sovereign states, including
“support for their territorial integrity and . . . noninterference in their internal
affairs”.17 Hence, the current practice prevents us from adequately protecting
individuals’ human rights within the borders of rights-violating states. To
preempt future rights-violators from using sovereignty as a shield against external
interference, Buchanan proposes that international law be reformed to make a
new polity’s recognition as sovereign conditional upon satisfying four conditions:
(1) Internal Justice Condition: the state must protect (or must not violate) its
citizens’ basic human rights.
13Buchanan’s characterization of nonideal theory here clearly resembles what I’ve called
transitional theory. The quote in footnote 11 suggests that Buchanan also conceives of his proposal
as part of clinical theory. In light of footnote 5, my point here implies that Buchanan has failed to
distinguish between the different conceptions of nonideal theory and, thus, identified the task of
clinical theory with the task of transitional theory. Since this is in effect what the ideal guidance
approach recommends, this is further evidence that Buchanan has adopted that approach.
14Buchanan 2004, p. 129.
15Ibid., pp. 142–7. The arguments presented to support this second thesis derive it from the first
thesis. Thus, (2) is, strictly speaking, a derivative thesis. But, as Buchanan notes, ideal theory
comprises not only basic principles of justice that are to be satisfied by any institutional structure, but
also “concrete principles that specify the institutional arrangements common to all systems . . . that
satisfy the constraints laid down by the most basic principles of justice” (p. 67). Buchanan says that
we are largely ignorant about principles of the second type with respect to the international legal
system, with “one notable exception”: that nation-states should be minimally constitutionally
democratic. Hence, (1) is a basic ideal theoretic principle of the first type, while (2) is a basic ideal




(2) External Justice Condition: the state must not violate the basic human
rights of other states’ citizens.
(3) Nonusurpation Condition: the state must not come about by usurping a
legitimate state.
(4) Minimal Democracy Condition: the state must be minimally democratic.18
Each and every state that meets these conditions must be granted recogni-
tional legitimacy; no state that fails to meet these conditions should be
recognized.
To philosophers, Buchanan’s argument looks just fine. He identifies a
morally problematic feature of international law and suggests a solution that at
least plausibly addresses the problem. So what’s my objection to this approach?
It’s not that the ideal guidance approach yields the wrong verdict about the
(in)justice of the current practice of recognition or identifies the wrong reasons
for thinking that this practice is unjust. An alternative approach might
ultimately arrive at the same verdict. Instead, the problem is that this approach
at best arrives at an incomplete analysis, not least by emphasizing only a subset
of the salient considerations for institutional design. Since international law
issues from the activity and resolutions of states (as represented by the relevant
government officials),19 the feasibility and effectiveness of Buchanan’s proposal
hangs on its sensitivity to (at the very least) a host of considerations concerning
both the likelihood and the depth of international cooperation on reforming
the practice of sovereign recognition in a way that will drastically limit states’
control over their internal affairs. Here I raise several considerations that
Buchanan neglects and their implications for his proposal.
For Buchanan’s proposal to have any effect on human rights performance,
states must be willing to enact a binding resolution with enforcement
provisions.20 States are usually willing to bind themselves in this way only if the
institutional mechanism is necessary to coordinate their activity to achieve a key
policy objective.21 One question, then, is whether states take human rights
protection abroad as a foreign policy objective that overrides competing policy
objectives. This seems implausible given even a cursory examination of the
historical record. For example, US foreign policy history is checkered with
support for rights-abusing dictators who were otherwise amenable to US foreign
policy objectives, as well as operations to overthrow democratically elected
18On the first two, see ibid., pp. 269–72; on the third, see p. 275ff.; on the fourth, see p. 278ff.
19I typically use “state” as shorthand for “the government officials who are taken to represent a
polity in international affairs”. Consequently, the interests that matter are those of the state officials.
Officials’ decisions are influenced by their constituents’ policy preferences via the domestic
institutional mechanisms in place for holding state officials accountable. Where such mechanisms are
robust, officials’ policy decisions largely reflect the interests of the people at large. Where those
mechanisms are weak, officials have more latitude in their policy decisions. Cf. Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2003; McGillivray and Smith 2008.
20See Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Hathaway 2002, 2007.
21Cf. Keohane 1984; Milner 1997; McGillivray and Smith 2008.
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governments who were deemed hostile to US interests.22 In addition,
rights-abusing states with great natural resource wealth continue to find support
despite their human rights record, such as China’s (among others’) continued
support for the Burmese military junta.
Rights-abusing states in particular will have little incentive to sign on to
reforms that will effectively prevent them from recognizing new rights-violating
states. To comply with the norm would only draw greater public attention to
their own rights-violating practices and risk arousing domestic opposition that
could be sufficient to drastically limit their ability to achieve their objectives.
Given that some of the most internationally influential states are among the worst
rights-abusers or most prominent supporters of rights-abusers (most notably,
China and Russia), Buchanan’s proposal is likely to meet stiff resistance among
this crowd.
Moreover, many states that are relatively rights-respecting at home support
rights-violating states abroad for a variety of reasons. Prominent among these
reasons is the gains accrued from cooperation with such states. For example,
many states with significant natural resource wealth turn out to be authoritarian,
rights-abusing regimes.23 Thus, otherwise rights-respecting states must cooperate
with rights-abusing states to meet their substantial resource needs.24 Given that
similar benefits would accrue to states that cooperate with future rights-abusing
regimes seeking recognition, states have little incentive to withhold recognition.
Were they to do so, they would forego the substantial gains from cooperating
with rights-abusing regimes.
Summing up: Buchanan’s proposal neglects several considerations that are
important for assessing the feasibility and effectiveness of his proposal. This is
because he takes “justice . . . as the fundamental vantage point from which to
evaluate the existing international legal system and to formulate proposals for
improving it”.25 In other words, the set of considerations to which Buchanan
gives adequate attention is restricted by the primacy he gives to his ideal
principles of justice. He thereby fails to acknowledge where our interest in
actually improving human rights protection might require us to make tradeoffs
between justice on the one hand and feasibility and effectiveness on the other. To
the extent that Buchanan’s ultimate objective is to prescribe reforms that “would
produce moral improvements” in our world, this is a serious blind spot. To
22Examples of the former include Fulgencio Batista, Mobutu Sese Seko, Pol Pot, and Saddam
Hussein (before the late-1980s). Examples of the latter include Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, the
Democratic Republic of Congo in 1960, and Nicaragua during the 1980s.
23The literature on this so-called “resource curse” is abundant. See, for example, Ross 1999, 2001;
Wantchekon 2002.
24Perhaps most important among these is the need for oil. Roughly 36% of the world’s oil is
produced by unquestionable human rights abusers (Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, and China), and of the
other top-15 producers, Amnesty International reported serious human rights concerns in seven of
them (US, Mexico, Venezuela, Kuwait, UAE, Nigeria, and Iraq). (Oil data from CIA 2008, human
rights information from Amnesty International 2008.)
25Buchanan 2004, p. 73.
52 DAVID WIENS
overcome this blind spot, our institutional design prescriptions must aim at more
than simply approximating ideal principles of justice. We must prescribe
solutions that are capable of overcoming social problems as we find them in the
actual world.
IV. THE FAILURE ANALYSIS APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
We need an alternate approach to clinical theory that integrates applied ethics
with applied social science. In this section, I develop an approach to clinical
institutional design called institutional failure analysis, which takes averting
failure to be the primary design aim. Failure analysis avoids the shortcomings of
the ideal guidance approach by dispensing with the need for ideal principles of
regulation to guide the design process. In the place of ideal theory, failure analysis
emphasizes hypothesis formulation and evaluation. This places the design
emphasis on overcoming actual social problems rather than on closing some gap
between the actual and an ideal.
The motivating insight of failure analysis is well-stated by Henry Petroski:
Desire, not necessity, is the mother of invention. New things and the ideas for
things come from our dissatisfaction with what there is and from the want of a
satisfactory thing for doing what we want done. More precisely, the development
of new artifacts and new technologies follows from the failure of existing ones to
perform as promised or as well as can be hoped for or imagined. Frustration and
disappointment associated with the use of a tool or the performance of a system
puts a challenge on the table: Improve the thing. Sometimes, as when a part
breaks in two, the focal point for the improvement is obvious. Other times, such
as when a complex system runs disappointingly slowly, the way to speed it up
may be far from clear. In all cases, however, the beginnings of a solution lay in
isolating the cause of the failure and in focusing on how to avoid, obviate,
remove, or circumvent it.26
We see here a thumbnail sketch of failure analysis as a design process. The
process starts with dissatisfaction, with a sense that some designed artifact
doesn’t work as well as we might like. It then proceeds to diagnose the problem:
In what does the failure consist? What caused it? Upon analyzing the failure, the
designer seeks to design something that will avoid the same fate by improving its
capacity to withstand similar pressures, by removing exploitable weaknesses, or
by constructing a design that is not subject to the same causal mechanism. Once
the new design is complete, the designer tries to anticipate ways in which the new
design might fail and, if any potential weaknesses are found, tries to improve the
design to avoid these shortcomings.27
26Petroski 2006, p. 1 (emphasis added).
27Cf. Petroski 1992, p. 44. A problem arises here for the analogy, namely, that the intended “use”
of institutional arrangements is usually much more contested than that of engineered artifacts. I
address this difficulty below.
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From this sketch, we can isolate three main phases of the failure analysis
design process: (1) identify a failure (i.e., a flawed product or service); (2)
diagnose the failure (i.e., analyze the character and cause of the failure); (3)
design an artifact to overcome identifiable failures, including potential future
failures. The design objective is, quite simply, to create things that avoid failure
as far as is feasible. Developing the institutional failure analysis approach
involves elaborating on each of these phases as they pertain to clinical
institutional design. I now discuss these in turn.
A. IDENTIFYING FAILURE
An institutional design project is motivated by an initial sense of dissatisfaction
with some feature of the social world, whether this is an observed undesirable
outcome or social arrangements that impose an undue risk of realizing some
undesirable outcome. However, an apparent disanalogy between engineering
design and institutional design arises immediately. Failure analysis presupposes a
well-defined design objective, which includes a set of general specifications that
an artifact must meet. This well-defined objective makes it easy to identify failure.
For example, a bridge should hold its intended load across the length of its span
while withstanding environmental pressures, such as wind load or earthquakes.
Bridges that fail to meet this design objective, or can only do so by incurring
unacceptable costs, are readily identifiable as failures.
But social and political institutions do not come with well-specified design
objectives. Indeed, politics is the process of contesting which ends are to be
pursued by institutions. Consequently, social failures seem identifiable only by
reference to some particular perspective. Asymmetric bargaining power in trade
negotiations is a failure for those who inhabit a weak bargaining position, but the
asymmetry rarely disturbs those who benefit from it. Income inequality is
problematic for those at the bottom of the distribution, but rarely disturbs those
who benefit from the institutions that lead to inequality. In general, this means
that social failures are notoriously difficult to identify. The institutional failure
analysis approach appears to suffer from an early setback.
This apparent difficulty gives life to the ideal guidance approach: how can we
know when some feature of the social world counts as a failure unless we know
how the social world should be constituted? It’s natural to think that ideal theory
is helpful here. Ideal theory yields a well-defined design objective; it identifies
principles that serve as a general specification any institutional order must meet
to count as just. With ideal principles of regulation in hand, failure identification
becomes a simple matter: an institutional order whose principles of regulation fall
short of or otherwise differ from the ideal counts as a failure. Since ideal theory
derives principles of justice from a putatively impartial perspective, we need not
worry about any particular perspective tainting our judgment. Ideal principles of
justice give us the requisite impartial critical edge.
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A clarification is in order before responding to this worry. “Ideal” ordinarily
connotes something like “that to which we (ought to) aspire”. Paradigmatic
examples of ideals in this sense include equality, individual liberty, and human
flourishing. With this in the background, my rejection of the ideal guidance
approach is apt to be interpreted as the claim that clinical theory ought not
appeal to ideals in this ordinary sense. Such an interpretation misunderstands
my claim. Ideal theory is not “a theory of ideals”, but a way of theorizing
about political principles that focuses on specifying the principles of regulation
that undergird an ideal institutional structure. These principles are arrived at
by reflection on the principles that best express our moral ideals (in the
ordinary sense) under ideal conditions, where “ideal conditions” denotes social
and political circumstances that more or less permit moral considerations to
take center stage in decisions about how to organize our collective life. For
example, Rawls’s difference principle is supposed to be the principle that best
expresses our collective commitment to an ideal of society as a system of fair
cooperation among citizens conceived as free and equal.28 But the derivation of
that principle makes idealizing assumptions to avoid complicating the moral
analysis too much. These include, among other things, that society is self-
sufficient and closed to transactions with outsiders, that citizens accept and
know that others accept a common set of principles, and that citizens fully
comply with the demands of the principles of justice.29
My rejection of the ideal guidance approach denies that the principles of
regulation that express our commitment to our moral ideals under ideal
conditions can or should offer any guidance for clinical theorizing. Importantly,
this does not entail that clinical theorizing ought to refrain from appealing to
moral ideals in the ordinary sense. In particular, it’s open to the failure analyst to
appeal to ordinary ideals, or values as I’ll call them, when discussing the
(in)justice of any particular social arrangements. To continue the above example,
my rejection of the ideal guidance approach denies that Rawls’s difference
principle can or should offer any direction for our thinking about the justice of
institutions that affect distribution under actual conditions. This is consistent
with appealing to the underlying value of society as a system of fair cooperation
among citizens conceived of as free and equal when assessing these institutions.
This is because the difference principle is not a conceptual truth; we don’t arrive
at the difference principle by simply analyzing the concepts expressed by the
value. The difference principle is a particular expression of that value, which
follows from our reflection on that value given a certain idealized conception of
the political world. To the extent that the derivation of that principle is sensitive
to changes in initial conditions, its service as an expression of an important value
28Rawls 1999a, §§ 1, 3, 4.
29Ibid., pp. 4, 8, 216.
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under different conditions will be in question.30 But this problem affects only
particular principles qua expressions of values, not the abstract values
themselves. Thus, the latter remain available to the failure analyst when assessing
institutional arrangements.
I now turn to a development of the failure analysis approach to identifying
social failures. We identify failure by examining the particulars of the state of
affairs that initially motivates the design project and then compare this state to
alternative feasible states of affairs.31 The contrast cases can be actual or
counterfactual; the key is that their realization be feasible. If we take actual cases,
we can be confident that the contrast class presents us with alternatives that are
in some sense feasible, since they present states of affairs that are already realized.
We need to be a little cautious when including counterfactual cases in the contrast
class, since the fact that they are not currently realized leaves us uncertain about
the extent to which their realization is feasible. However, this shouldn’t preclude
our making comparisons with counterfactual alternatives. We don’t want our
sense of which states of affairs are practically possible to be limited by what is
actual. The general point is that we should be judicious in selecting our contrast
cases, since these are going to determine which conditions to take as problematic
and which to take as moral goals.32
A case about which there is reasonable disagreement will work best to
illustrate my point here, so say we’re dissatisfied with health care provision in the
United States. For our set of contrast cases, we might select Canada, Cuba,
Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Sweden, and Tanzania. (I stick with actual cases for
simplicity.) We start by making a rough intuitive ordering of these cases according
to the relative justice of their health care provision schemes—for example (from
best to worst): Canada, Sweden, United States, Cuba, Mexico, Russia, Tanzania,
and Nigeria. This first cut ordering will be relative to some particular
interpretation of justice, is likely to focus on some dimensions of health care
provision at the expense of others, and is almost certain to be contested. This is
fine for now; all we need is some set of orderings to serve as the raw material for
the next step of failure identification.
30This point clearly echoes the basic idea expressed by Lipsey and Lancaster’s (1957) general
theory of second best: an institutional arrangement that is optimal under ideal conditions is unlikely
to be so once we deviate from any of those conditions. The optimal arrangements under nonideal
conditions are likely to require (perhaps drastic) alterations to the principles of regulation identified
by ideal theory. Cf. Coram 1996; Goodin 1995.
31Cf. Sen’s (2009) distinction between “comparative” and “transcendental”—i.e., ideal
theoretic—approaches to justice. Although Sen identifies the crux of this distinction as being one of
distinct objectives, the key difference between the two approaches is more accurately described as one
of method. Transcendental theory employs the ideal guidance approach to identify principles to
govern our selection of institutional arrangements. The comparative approach identifies these
principles by examining and reflecting on our comparative judgments of actual or feasible social
conditions. My development of the failure analysis approach explores this difference in method.
32More needs to be said about how to select counterfactual cases. Since feasibility is a workhorse
concept here, its definition is crucial but beyond the scope of this paper. The relevant literature on
feasibility includes the following: Brennan and Pettit 2005; Cowen 2007; Räikkä 1998.
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The next step is to justify any particular ordering as capturing morally
salient differences between the cases. At this point, one reflects on the
considerations motivating any particular ordering and offers reasons for
thinking that these considerations are (among) the morally salient ones when it
comes to judging health care regimes. Example considerations include
performance along objective health benchmarks (life expectancy, infant
mortality rates, disease rates, etc.), health care spending efficiency, and scope of
access to health care. Suppose one’s ordering is primarily driven by a country’s
performance according to objective health benchmarks, as the above ranking
is,33 while another’s ranking is primarily driven by access-related
considerations. On behalf of the above ranking, one might say that health
outcomes are key when judging health care regimes because a society should be
primarily concerned with the objective well-being of its citizens and positive
health outcomes are important markers of well-being. On behalf of access-
related considerations, one might say that citizens, in virtue of their common
status as citizens, are entitled to equal treatment in the allocation of health care
resources. This is far from a complete characterization of what takes place at
this point, but the picture being painted is sufficient to illustrate the point.
Once we have a set of first cut orderings, we set about justifying an ordering
as authoritative, which leads us to reflect upon the moral values we endorse
and our reasons for endorsing them, as well as identifying the principles that
best express those values. Moral justification requires us to engage in the
process of supporting the moral authority of an ordering with impartial
reasons—reasons that do not appeal to any particular person’s situation or
interests. Such a process will include appeals to abstract moral values.
Importantly, this is not the same as identifying the principles of regulation that
govern the ideal health care regime.
At some point, this debate will lead us to some shared judgments, although we
are unlikely to arrive at complete consensus. For example, all parties to the
debate might agree that health outcomes and access-related considerations are
both important, although they might disagree on their reasons for thinking so or
the relative weight assigned to each. No matter. This rough agreement still
permits us to make judgments of the following sort: improving objective health
outcomes in Nigeria and Tanzania constitutes an improvement in health care
provision; increasing access to health care provision in the United States
constitutes an improvement in health care provision. These verdicts imply
judgments of failure. When we judge that some state of affairs S can be improved
upon, we are committed to the claim that S is not as good as it could be. But not
just that. Since our comparative judgments issue from our reflection on the moral
values that underpin our judgments, our reasons for taking any ordering as
morally authoritative imply that S is not as good as it should be. In Sen’s words,
33The above ranking is according to life expectancy at birth, 2010 estimates. See CIA 2010.
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these judgments identify “remediable injustices”.34 On the failure analysis
approach, a failure just is a remediable injustice.
One might object that this makes failure an overly capacious concept, which
undermines its critical edge. Perhaps failure should be reserved for social
conditions we deem severe injustices requiring urgent attention. But failure need
not be constituted by utter inability to meet design expectations. Instead, a failure
is constituted by the presence of a remediable design flaw. We can comfortably
acknowledge that instances of failure will differ along a number of dimensions,
including ease of identification, severity, and (moral) urgency. A bridge collapse
constitutes a greater failure than an unwieldy water bottle. Similarly, avoidable
famine, genocide, total breakdown of the rule of law, and arbitrary detention and
torture are more grievous and more urgent than, say, disparities in educational
quality or employment opportunities. It’s true that the generosity of the failure
concept will preclude the identification procedure from generating fine-grained
distinctions among failures, which could help us set remediation priorities. But
that’s not the job of the identification procedure. The identification procedure
simply seeks to identify the members of the set of failures. Once we’ve identified
(some of) the members of this set, we engage in further reflection and debate
about our remediation priorities, debate that will and should appeal to
considerations generated by our diagnosis of the failure and our anticipation of
the effects of various intervention possibilities.
The preceding has exposed an important difference between the ideal guidance
and failure analysis approaches. On the former, a social process or outcome is
identified as a failure because it diverges from the processes or outcomes that
would arise from a fully just institutional order. On the latter, there is no
comparison with an ideal institutional order because there is no ex ante target
institutional order. As a result, there is no preexisting blueprint from which actual
institutions could diverge. Instead, we identify failures by making comparisons
between actual and feasible states of affairs and finding that some actual states
aren’t as good as they could (and should) be. Consequently, we don’t need a
blueprint of the ideal institutional order to tell us which social conditions
constitute failures.
In fact, such a blueprint is liable to bias our identification of failures because
it prejudges what counts as a problem and thereby restricts our attention to
certain features of the social world. Take Dewey’s criticism of laissez-faire
liberalism (i.e., libertarianism) as an example.35 Libertarianism identifies
individual liberty with individual economic enterprise more or less unconstrained
by government regulation. The concomitant institutional ideal consists of an
unregulated market for all goods in which people could have an interest. When
a libertarian assesses the justice of an institutional order, her attention is restricted
34Sen 2009, p. vii.
35What follows draws from Dewey [1935] 2000, ch. 2, passim.
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by her expectation that a just institutional order includes (at least) an unregulated
market. The problem, in Dewey’s words, is that libertarians have “put forward
their ideas as immutable truths good at all times and places.” Accordingly, the
values of libertarianism have become reified: “[T]hey [hold] that beneficial social
change can come about in but one way, the way of private economic enterprise,
socially undirected, based upon and resulting in the sanctity of private property.”
This is due to a lack of “historical sense”; libertarians have been “blinded . . . to
the fact that their own special interpretations of liberty, individuality and
intelligence were themselves historically conditioned, and were relevant only to
their own time”. Once the sought-after reforms were accomplished, what was
once a force for social change thus became a force in favor of the status quo.
Consequently, adherence to the laissez-faire ideal blinds libertarians to the
obstacles to effective liberty brought about by the market institution. Since their
attention is directed by their favored institutional ideal, libertarians have failed to
see the ways in which liberty is restricted by that very ideal.
The general lesson here is this: one doesn’t need to know what the ideal
institutional order looks like to be able to identify social failures. The ideal
guidance view locates the blueprint at the wrong place, prior to the failure
identification phase. But the creation of the blueprint is a result of the design
process. There is no blueprint prior to the design phase, let alone the
identification phase.
B. DIAGNOSING FAILURE
Once we’ve identified a social problem, we set about diagnosing that problem.
This diagnostic phase incorporates both normative and empirical analyses. A
return to the architecture/engineering analogy is useful here to get a grip on how
the normative and empirical are intertwined. Architectural failures and
engineering failures differ in virtue of the distinct design aims of architecture and
engineering. Architectural design fails when space is poorly organized, or when
component textures, materials, colors, and so on are poorly juxtaposed, or when
the structure is a poor fit—functionally, artistically, aesthetically—with the
surrounding environment. As examples, consider the structures that often show
up on “ugly building” lists, such as Boston City Hall, the Experience Music
Project (Seattle), and the Scottish Parliament Building (Edinburgh).36 Engineering
design fails when structural elements are unable to withstand environmental
pressures, or when the object functions poorly or not at all under the conditions
for which it was designed, or when the object is unsafe for use. Examples of
engineering failures include bridge and building collapses, such as the Tacoma
Narrows Bridge (1942) and the Hyatt Regency walkway (Kansas City, 1981).
From the different lists of examples, it should be clear that architectural and
36See Steere 2008; Schiffman 2002; Virtual Tourist 2010.
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engineering failures have distinct characters. Accordingly, the two require
different sorts of diagnoses. When diagnosing architectural failures, we
characterize the ways in which the object deviates from accepted standards or
norms of architectural design. On occasion, architecture that was initially
criticized is later seen as pushing the field in a positive, innovative direction.
Hence, architectural analysis also involves re-evaluating the standards by which
we assess architecture. In contrast, when diagnosing engineering failures, we
identify the causal processes that generated the failure, in particular, the
weaknesses in a structure or process and the pressures that were able to exploit
that weakness.
Given that institutional design comprises both architectural and engineering
problems, institutional failure analysis requires two types of diagnosis. Moral
diagnosis identifies the features of an institutional structure that deviate from
widely accepted norms and values, but also re-evaluates those norms and values.
Causal diagnosis identifies the causal mechanisms generating the social
conditions we seek to alter.
In practice, the tasks of moral and causal analysis are rarely separable. Our
evaluation and selection of the moral principles by which we assess institutional
arrangements will be informed by our causal analysis of current conditions. If
income inequality is an unavoidable feature of collective economic life and we
think collective economic life is important (or inevitable), then we might decrease
the weight we give to particular egalitarian moral principles when morally
assessing institutions. But if income inequality is a result of institutions that
unnecessarily and unjustifiably restrict the economic opportunities of an
underclass, we might retain those same egalitarian moral principles as important
standards for institutional assessment.
Moral considerations also play an important role in identifying the causal
mechanisms to which our causal diagnoses pay attention. For example,
commodity price volatility almost certainly plays a causal role in generating the
resource curse.37 Thus, the independent market decisions of investors and
consumers that are responsible in the aggregate for this price volatility are, at
least in part, causally responsible for the misery associated with the resource
curse. However, we don’t typically identify these independent market decisions as
causes of the curse and not simply because it’s unlikely that we could adequately
coordinate those decisions to avoid price volatility. In addition, we take it for
granted that the market freedom that generates price volatility is a value that we
should protect. Consequently, we turn our attention to other causal mechanisms.
In the case at hand, we hold the fact of price volatility fixed and turn our
attention to the mechanisms that make the economic performance of resource
abundant states vulnerable to price shocks. All this is to say that moral and causal
analyses are practically inseparable. Nevertheless, it can be useful to think of
37See Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz 2007, ch. 1.
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moral and causal analyses as analytically distinct. With this in mind, I now
elaborate on my sketch of the diagnostic task.
Moral diagnosis characterizes the ways in which a social process or outcome
constitutes amoral problem. This involves considering which values we want our
social life to embody, why these values are important, and which moral principles
best express those values. Do we prize equality? What about equality is
important? Is individual liberty a key value? How is liberty restricted under
current conditions? Although these questions inquire about abstract moral values
and principles, on the failure analysis approach, we do not settle these questions
solely in the abstract. Instead, our reflection on moral principles is guided by
reflection on actual social conditions.
Consider Mill’s vigorous criticism of Victorian marriage contracts as the sort
of moral diagnosis I have in mind.38 Mill begins his criticism in earnest by
examining “the conditions which the laws of this and all other countries annex
to the marriage contract”.39 Among other ills, such contracts left a woman
effectively propertyless and thereby without economic security should her
husband die or divorce her. Without any property of her own, she was financially
dependent on her husband and without any credible exit threat should her
husband abuse her. Women had no legal rights over their children; these were
granted only to men. What’s more, women were compelled into this position of
servitude because they were banned from pursuing the means to independence,
such as an education or a career. Mill compares the position of women to that of
a slave:
I am far from pretending that wives are in general no better treated than slaves; but
no slave is a slave to the same lengths, and in so full a sense of the word, as a wife
is. Hardly any slave, except one immediately attached to the master’s person, is a
slave at all hours and all minutes; in general he has, like a soldier, his fixed task, and
when it is done, or when he is off duty, he disposes, within certain limits of his own
time, and has a family life into which the master rarely intrudes. . . . But it cannot
be so with the wife.40
The implicit argument here is that the Victorian marriage institution subjected
women to a position that was deemed unfit for slaves and that the continued
subjection of women to such conditions was inconsistent with earlier judgments
against subjecting slaves to such conditions. In other places, Mill compares
marriage to political tyranny, implying that the marriage contract subjected
women to a position relative to their husbands to which no man would have
consented in relation to a political ruler.
Mill’s strategy involves enumerating the conditions that result from a
particular institution and then exposing the conflict between these conditions and
38Mill [1869] 2002, esp. chs 2 and 3.
39Ibid., p. 153.
40Ibid., p. 155.
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the moral principles we might justifiably endorse upon reflection. This results in
both moral criticism of the conditions of marriage and a re-assessment of the
convictions that keep those conditions in place. What’s striking about Mill’s
strategy from the perspective of conventional political theory is what he doesn’t
say. Mill does not argue for a set of ideal principles of justice and then employ
them to justify treating women as equals. Starting with abstract principles of
justice permits us to rationalize concrete social conditions, to point to the ways
in which the status quo is consistent with the requirements of these principles.
This often requires minimizing (or altogether ignoring) inconvenient facts. By
starting with concrete conditions, we cannot be let off the hook. We must come
face-to-face with the details of our social reality and try to reconcile those details
with our convictions. Often times, we cannot.41
Importantly, on the failure analysis view, the diagnostic phase involves not
only identifying the ways in which current conditions undermine important
values, but also re-evaluating the standards by which we assess social conditions.
Moral principles are adopted in light of particular social conditions. Under
conditions of inequality, particular egalitarian principles are endorsed; under
conditions of slavery or tyranny, liberty is championed. But social conditions are
in continual flux. Hence, “old principles [might] not fit contemporary life as it is
lived, however well they may have expressed the vital interests of the times in
which they arose”.42 The diagnostic phase demands that we reconsider our moral
principles in light of our social reality to avoid adopting principles that are
ill-suited to current conditions and to prevent principles of justice from becoming
reified.
Keeping in mind the purely analytic distinction between moral and causal
analysis, our causal analysis is an entirely empirical task. We are interested in
explaining the outcome, not in assessing it according to normative criteria.
Thus, causal analysis involves identifying the salient components of the causal
process(es) that generate an outcome and specifying their interrelationships.
This latter part includes specifying how the components interact and
41One might turn around and press this claim against my argument, namely, that failure analysis
has a conservative bias. After all, on my view, coming face-to-face with social reality only leads to
judgments of injustice (and thus a need to prescribe interventions) if we find features of that reality
dissatisfying. Accordingly, we might follow G. A. Cohen (2003, p. 243) in claiming that “the question
for political philosophy is not what we should do but what we should think, even when what we
should think makes no practical difference”. But Cohen’s claim is consistent with my rejection of the
ideal guidance approach and gives me a way to reply to this “conservative bias” charge. The failure
analysis approach rejects the claim that ideal principles of justice are useful for guiding clinical
institutional design. But it need not reject the claim that ideal theory can be useful for guiding our
attitudes toward our social reality, including actual institutional arrangements. Finding gaps between
actual institutional arrangements and ideal institutional arrangements motivates acute dissatisfaction
with current arrangements, thereby initiating the design process. Thus, ideal theory can be important
formotivating design prescriptions. This is consistent with the claim that the principles it yields ought
not guide clinical institutional design. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to address
this issue.)
42Dewey [1927] 1954, p. 135.
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how changes in one part of the process affect (the operation of) other
components.43
Successfully incorporating causal diagnoses into our clinical theorizing
requires philosophers to critically engage with the relevant social scientific
research. Unfortunately, the quality of philosophers’ interaction with social
science is spotty and there seems to be no clear sense of how to most effectively
incorporate social science into normative debate. This is not the place to give a
full account of the methodological rules that should guide such interaction.
Instead, I briefly outline some of the common missteps to help motivate clinical
theorists’ need to reflect more on how greater critical interaction with social
scientists can enrich their institutional analyses, as well as why their institutional
analyses require such interaction.
One key problem is that philosophers’ typical mode of engagement with social
science tends to treat the latter as providing ready-made, “off-the-shelf” answers
to the scientific questions relevant to institutional design. This results in the
widespread practice of simply citing social scientific results to support the
empirical premises one wishes to employ. This type of passive reliance is
problematic. First, it’s bad practice. Not all studies are equal in quality. Many
studies have poorly specified statistical models or unsuitable formal models,
which bias the results of the study.44 Citing biased results vitiates an argument for
an institutional design proposal that presupposes the state of affairs portrayed by
the biased results.
Second, a body of social scientific literature is not necessarily relevant to the
specific institutional design question simply because it ostensibly addresses the
same broad topic. There are two general pitfalls here, both of which discredit any
argument that succumbs to them. One is that the data used in the cited empirical
literature might be poor measures of the phenomena with which the normative
literature is concerned.45 The other pitfall is relying on an empirical literature that
speaks to the effect of some intervention on one type of outcome when the
normative debate is concerned with that intervention’s effect on another type of
outcome. For example, Mathias Risse argues that our duty to alleviate severe
individual poverty generates a duty to assist poor countries’ attempts to improve
their domestic institutions on the basis of research that shows domestic
43Full description of what causal analysis involves requires, at a minimum, a social ontology,
which identifies the fundamental objects of social causal processes; and, furthermore, an account of
social causation, which says whether there are any social laws or mechanisms and specifies their
respective roles in causal explanations of social phenomena. This is not the place to present such an
account. For useful introductions to the relevant topics, see Elster 2007; Hedström and Swedberg
1998.
44Misspecification is more widespread than one would hope. For example, see Brambor, Clark,
and Golder (2006) on the pervasive misspecification of interactive statistical models in the top
political science journals.
45For example, Reddy and Pogge (2009) find extant measures of poverty lacking. But see Ravallion
(2009) for a rebuttal.
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institutional quality to be a key determinant of aggregate economic growth.46
Aggregate economic growth might be related to individual prosperity, but not
obviously so.47 Whether economic growth leads to poverty reduction depends on
how the gains from growth are distributed, and the gains aren’t always
distributed evenly.48 The point is that Risse’s argument would be much more
compelling were he to appeal to studies with individual-level outcomes as their
dependent variables. The content of our duty to poor individuals depends on
what causes prosperity for individuals, not countries.
Third, political philosophers are too easily satisfied to rely on correlations
identified by social scientists. The problem here is that an institutional design
prescription proposes a way to intervene in and alter an existing causal process
that is generating a problematic outcome. Thus, the salient question is: what
causal mechanisms generate the identified correlations? In basing a prescription
upon mere correlations, philosophers are in danger of prescribing, at best,
interventions that alleviate symptoms instead of targeting the underlying cause,
and, at worst, interventions that leave the operative causal process untouched.
Thomas Pogge’s discussion of the international resource privilege illustrates this
point.49 Pogge argues that the resource privilege is important for explaining the
severe poverty found in resource abundant countries on the basis of two
correlations: that between resources and low economic growth, and that
between resources and authoritarian rule. To be sure, there are causal
explanations of these correlations on offer.50 But Pogge never concerns himself
with the business of sketching, or even citing an account of the operative causal
mechanisms. Such an account is what he needs to infer that the resource
privilege harms the global poor. To conclude that the resource privilege harms
the poor on the basis of these correlations, the causal logic that links resource
abundance with civil conflict and authoritarianism must be of a piece with the
causal logic that links resource abundance with reduced economic growth.
What we need is an explanation that includes the causal processes linking
resources, economic growth, and authoritarianism as part of a single, coherent,
unified causal analysis.
The lesson here is twofold. First, causal analysis requires going beyond
philosophers’ typically passive modes of engagement with social science.
Relatedly, successful clinical theorizing crucially involves diagnosing the problem
we seek to overcome, a task that necessarily involves causal analysis. Thus, it’s a
weakness of the ideal guidance approach that it generates prescriptions that
typically ignore the importance of adequate causal analysis.
46Risse 2005.
47See, e.g., Dollar and Kraay (2002) in support of the connection between aggregate growth and
individual prosperity. For criticism, see Ravallion 2001.
48World Bank 2001.
49See Pogge 2002, pp. 113–4, 163–5.
50I discuss this issue in depth elsewhere (Wiens 2010).
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C. DESIGNING TO AVOID FAILURE
Once we have a working diagnosis, we set ourselves to the design task. This
balances design objectives that follow from both the moral and causal diagnoses.
Normatively, the design aim is to prescribe institutional solutions that will bring
about social conditions that comport with the moral values we can endorse on
the basis of impartial reasons. The design aim that follows from our causal
diagnosis is to prescribe feasible institutional solutions that can intervene
effectively at important places in the causal process to improve the outcome.
Again, although we may analytically separate the normative and empirical
design aims, in practice, they are tightly intertwined. Return again to the
architecture/engineering analogy. Architects and engineers mutually constrain the
design process. As my construction example in Section 2 illustrated, the physical
limits of different structural materials and their various possible configurations
constrain architectural possibilities; architectural standards and values constrain
the set of desirable engineering solutions. Similarly, the moral principles we
choose to endorse are constrained by the means required to realize those
principles, while our assessment of interventions is constrained by the moral cost
of implementing those interventions. To illustrate these points, consider the
following (perhaps extreme) examples. If the realization of global income
equality requires the establishment of a world government and the latter would
entail unacceptable costs (moral or otherwise), the foregoing requires that we
reconsider our endorsement of global income equality as an attractive moral aim.
Similarly, if the best means to consolidating democratic governance requires
drastically circumscribing the liberty of dissenters, the foregoing requires that we
look for other ways to consolidate democratic reforms.
A key part of the design phase is design evaluation. We are not interested
solely in overcoming identified failures; we also seek to forestall identifiable
failures. Each institutional design proposal is a hypothesis that the institution
as designed will successfully achieve its objective under the conditions in which
it will be required to operate. Given the stakes, we can’t accept such
hypotheses blindly. Nor is intuition a reliable check. Thus, the last phase of the
design process is to evaluate our design hypotheses for potential weaknesses
and potentially negative path dependencies. Will the proposal generate morally
perverse consequences? Will the institution be exploited by enterprising
opportunists? Will it close off important possibilities for improvement in the
future? Should we find weaknesses, we return to the drawing board to find
ways to shore them up. If simple fixes aren’t available, we need to consider
overhauling the original proposal. The aim is to establish institutions that can
foster and coordinate interactions in a way that, when aggregated, lead to
morally improved social conditions that keep open possibilities for future
improvement, as well as mitigate or contain the negative consequences of
socially destructive interactions.
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The importance of the evaluation phase and the willingness to revise in light of
potential weaknesses suggests that clinical theorizing is a fluid, experimental
process. We do not seek to propose an institutional configuration for all time.
Nor do we aim to put together a “master plan” that encompasses an entire
system of institutions. We are, of course, interested in uncovering the interactions
between distinct components of a larger system and avoiding negative
interactions as far as possible. But we should not hold out hope for a fully
worked out ideal. Our vision is too limited, our knowledge too local. Each
proposal is tentative and experimental, aiming at piecemeal, incremental
progress.
None of the foregoing shows that the design process need not be guided by
target states of affairs. Indeed, when stating the aim of the design phase, I claimed
that we had “morally improved social conditions” in view. Doesn’t this suggest
the need for ideal theory to guide our thinking about what constitutes “morally
improved social conditions”? To make the objection stronger, note that it need
not rely on a view of ideal theory as delivering a singular best state of affairs. The
easy reply in this case is that ideal theory is not up to the job.51 All that’s required
to get the objection off the ground is that the design phase must be prospective
in the sense that it requires a more or less well-specified target state of affairs and
that ideal theory is required to identify the principles of regulation that govern the
targeted arrangements. This is sufficient to vindicate at least a restricted version
of the ideal guidance approach.
The fact that clinical theory seeks to bring about a moral improvement of
social conditions suggests that clinical institutional design must aim at
something, namely, morally improved social conditions. But on the failure
analysis approach, the design phase is largely retrospective in the sense that our
sights are set by looking backward, at the places we’ve been rather than at the
places we’d like to go to. We design institutions to avert failure, not to realize
an ideal. To be sure, the evaluation phase requires that we try to anticipate
potential future failures and we might say that this makes failure analytic
design prospective. But this is not prospective in the sense used by the ideal
guidance approach. More accurately, it is counterfactually retrospective. That
is, the evaluation phase examines where we would have been had we
implemented the original design proposal. Our design aim then is to overcome
these counterfactual failures.
Designing to overcome failures has no need for the principles of regulation
identified by ideal theory. All we need to know is (1) which possible solutions
are feasible; (2) which of the feasible solutions are morally acceptable; and (3)
which of the feasible, morally acceptable solutions are likely to effectively
intervene at the appropriate place in the causal process generating the failure.
None of this makes reference to the principles of regulation identified by ideal
51See Sen 2009, ch. 4.
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theory. One might argue that we need ideal theory to identify the morally
acceptable solutions within the feasible set. But there’s no reason to employ the
overwrought framework of ideal theory to help us here. Attempting to identify
ideally just arrangements and the principles that regulate them is liable to
distract from the task of identifying solutions. In any case, ordinary moral
reasoning is sufficient for identifying which feasible options are morally
acceptable. Return to the earlier discussion of the comparative method for
identifying failures (Section 4.1). A similar method is effective here too. We
take our current social conditions and compare them to the conditions that
would arise were we to implement some particular feasible institutional
solution. We then ask ourselves: Do we think the counterfactual conditions are
acceptable? Are the counterfactual conditions an improvement upon current
conditions? On the basis of which principles do we make these judgments? Can
we justifiably endorse these principles upon reflection? This comparative
process needs nothing like ideal theory to identify principles of regulation to
serve as targets for clinical theory. The resources we need to prescribe morally
progressive institutional solutions are available without having to take on
board the baggage of ideal theory.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
I’ve argued that we should abandon ideal theory in our attempts to prescribe
institutional reforms to address actual injustices and adopt a failure analytic
approach to clinical institutional design. But the preceding development of the
failure analysis approach has remained largely abstract. It remains to be seen
how substantive clinical theorizing about particular problems can be improved
by adopting this approach. The best way to do this is to employ the failure
analysis framework in thinking about problems like extreme poverty and
inequality, war and military intervention, and gender and racial discrimination.
For obvious reasons, I must leave this for another time.52 Nonetheless, the
foregoing is sufficient to outline the key differences between failure analysis
and the conventional approach to clinical theorizing. The primary drawback
of the ideal guidance approach is its myopia; it focuses on understanding
and applying an ideal of justice at the expense of a detailed understanding of
the problem. Failure analysis overcomes this myopia by refocusing our
attention on the problem. By integrating empirical (causal) analysis with moral
analysis, a failure analytic approach is more sensitive to the complexities of the
problems we wish to address without sacrificing sensitivity to the important
moral considerations that rightly constrain our attempts to address our social
failures.
52But see Wiens (2010) for an application of the failure analysis approach to clinical theorizing
about the resource curse.
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